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1. Introduction 
Small group or small team decision making is ubiquitous. Boards decide on monetary policies 
and corporate strategies, families decide on holidays and purchases, governments decide on 
economic policies, and teams in trade unions and in companies shape wage negotiations. 
Some teams have a hierarchical structure, others aggregate preferences in a setting in which 
all team members are equal ex ante. For reasons of parsimony we focus on the latter case, as 
do most contributions to the quickly growing literature on differences in decision making 
between individuals and small teams (c.f., Charness and Sutter, 2012, or Kugler et al., 2012, 
for instance). Teams with ex ante equal members that aggregate preferences to a single 
decision and do not face an internal conflict of interest in material terms are called unitary 
groups or unitary teams.1 
 Many decisions in unitary teams concern the distribution of an amount of money or 
some other resource between the team and another team or individual. In such decisions, the 
theoretical prediction for own-money maximizing team members is trivial. As soon as team 
members exhibit heterogeneous social preferences, however, the aggregation of these 
preferences into a joint team decision becomes relevant. The vast majority of the existing 
literature in economics infers results on the aggregation of social preferences within teams 
from the behavior of individuals in interactive games (e.g., Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Cox, 
2002; Bornstein et al., 2004; Kugler et al., 2007). The general finding is that team decisions 
are closer to the rational own-money maximizing prediction than individual decisions. 
However, there is also a small number of results with the opposite finding of less selfish team 
decisions (e.g., Kocher and Sutter, 2007; Müller and Tan, 2013). 
 In games, (bounded) rationality, other-regarding preferences and beliefs (about the 
behavior, the expectations or the types of others) are often hard to disentangle. Hence, one has 
to be cautious in over-interpreting the above results when the intention is to study the 
aggregation of social preferences in small teams. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
papers use the simplest possible allocation task – the dictator game – to assess the differences 
between team and individual decisions. Cason and Mui (1997) do not find a significant 
difference between two-person teams and individuals (but report more other-regarding team 
choices when team members differ in their individual dictator game choices). Also using a 
dictator game, but with teams of three persons, Luhan et al. (2009) find that teams behave 
                                                 
1 The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, sometimes not. We stick to the term 
“team” in the following. 
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more selfishly than individuals. Given the inconclusiveness of existing results, additional 
evidence on the aggregation of social preferences within small teams seems desirable. 
 Furthermore, while the dictator game is a good starting point for establishing 
differences in social preferences between individuals and teams and for analyzing the 
aggregation of individual preferences in teams, it is not suitable to distinguish between 
different individual motivations for pro-social behavior and it gives no information on the 
presence of anti-social motives. There is good reason to believe – if one takes a closer look at 
some of the results in the literature on team decisions in interactive games (Charness and 
Sutter, 2012; Kugler et al., 2012) – that one should distinguish between different motivations. 
In particular, efficiency orientation seems to be amplified in team decision making, whereas 
inequality-averse choices seem to be less prevalent among teams than among individuals. 
Also, it seems important to find out whether teams and individuals differ in the relative 
frequency of anti-social motivations. It is exactly this disentangling of different motivations 
for pro-social behavior and the elicitation of anti-social motives of small teams versus 
individual decision makers that is the object of interest in the current paper.  
More specifically, we provide evidence from a controlled laboratory experiment, in 
which we use the double price-list technique developed by Kerschbamer (2010) to elicit the 
distributional preferences of subjects under two different decision-making regimes: an 
individual regime, in which subjects make their allocation decisions independently and in 
which each choice has consequences for the decision maker and one passive agent; and a team 
regime in which subjects assigned to groups of three must reach their allocation decisions 
unanimously with the help of communication and in which each choice has consequences for 
each group member and each member of a passive group. We employ a mixed within- and 
between-subjects design in two sets of sessions run in two consecutive weeks. In the first 
week all subjects are exposed to the individual regime. In the second week some subjects are 
again exposed to the individual regime, while the rest make their choices in the team regime. 
This design feature allows us to address the question how the revealed distributional 
preferences of individual team members (in the individual regime in week 1) translate into 
‘team preferences’ (in the team regime in week 2). It also allows us to test whether individual 
choices in the allocation tasks remain stable over time – which turns out to be the case – and 
whether the randomization of the assignment of subjects to the individual and the team regime 
in week 2 was successful – which it was. 
 Our main finding is that the decision-making regime, i.e., whether decisions are made 
by individuals or by teams, has an economically strong and statistically significant impact on 
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revealed distributional preferences in the allocation tasks. In other words, the type of the 
decision maker – individual or team – matters in the context of allocation decisions. In 
particular, teams are significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality – that is, in decision making environments where the peer is 
ahead – while benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across 
decision-making regimes. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that, while a 
substantial fraction (15%) of individuals are classified as inequality averse, this type 
disappears completely in the case of team decision making. Spiteful types are also markedly 
more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the other hand, by far more teams 
than individuals are classified as efficiency lovers. The fact that team decision making results 
in a very high proportion (over 90%) of choices consistent with a taste for efficiency and at 
the same time eliminates choices consistent with inequality aversion, is in our view the single 
most interesting result of this study. It confirms the ad-hoc hypothesis from previous 
experiments that could, however, not rigorously test for specific individual motivations. 
 Motivated by the strong differences in the choices of individuals and teams, we open 
the ‘black box’ of decision making within teams to gain some insights into the process that 
aggregates individual preferences into team choices. Our two main findings in this respect are, 
first, that efficiency lovers – and, more generally, subjects with a positive benevolence in the 
domain of disadvantageous inequality – are, ceteris paribus, more assertive, in the sense that 
they are generally more successful in getting their team to adopt their preferred choices. And, 
second, as a content analysis of the chat logs reveals, certain types of arguments are 
significantly more – or less – persuasive than others during the team’s communication. For 
instance, appeals to own income maximization are, somewhat surprisingly, detrimental to 
assertiveness, as are arguments in favor of strong altruistic behavior (that is, giving up own 
income to help the other). 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some details on the 
technique that we use for the elicitation of distributional preferences, as well as on the 
specifics of our design. Section 3 presents our findings regarding revealed distributional 
preferences of individuals and teams and the differences between the two. Section 4 focuses 
on decision making at the team level and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Experimental Design 
2.1. Elicitation of Distributional Preferences 
The elicitation of distributional preferences is based on the double price-list technique 
developed by Kerschbamer (2010). This procedure exposes subjects to a series of binary 
choices between allocations that involve an own payoff for the decision maker (individual or 
team) and a payoff for a randomly matched anonymous second entity, the passive agent 
(individual or team). In each of the binary decision problems one of the two allocations is 
symmetric (i.e., egalitarian – involving equal payoffs for the two agents) while the other one 
is asymmetric (involving unequal payoffs for the two agents). In half of the problems the 
asymmetric allocation is such that the decision maker is ahead, in the other half it is such that 
the decision maker is behind in monetary terms. For both cases the test systematically varies 
the price of giving (or taking) by increasing the own material payoff of the decision maker in 
the asymmetric allocation while keeping the other payoffs constant. 
 
<insert Table 1 about here> 
 
We used the ten-items version of the procedure displayed in Table 1. With our 
parameterization the egalitarian allocation gives 20 points to both agents, at the exchange rate 
of 20 Euro-Cents per point (i.e., 5 points = 1 Euro). In five of the ten binary choices – labeled 
in Table 1 (but not in the experimental instructions) as disadvantageous inequality block – the 
payoff of the passive agent in the asymmetric allocation is 30 points while the payoff of the 
decision maker increases from one choice to the next from 15 points in the first choice task to 
25 points in the last one. In the other five binary choices – the advantageous inequality block 
– the payoff of the passive agent in the asymmetric allocation is ten points while the rest is 
exactly as in the disadvantageous inequality block – that is, the payoff of the decision maker 
in the asymmetric allocation increases again from one choice to the next from 15 points to 25 
points. 
 
<insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Given this design, in each of the two blocks a rational decision maker switches at most 
once from the symmetric to the asymmetric allocation (and never in the other direction) and 
the switch points in the two blocks are informative about the decision maker’s archetype and 
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intensity of distributional preferences.2 Specifically, when faced with the five binary choices 
in the disadvantageous inequality block, a rational decision maker who decides for the 
asymmetric allocation already in the first choice task reveals that he is benevolent in the 
domain of disadvantageous inequality. Why? Because he is willing to give up own material 
income to increase the material payoff of the passive agent. Specifically, the decision maker is 
willing to give up at least five points to increase the material payoff of the passive agent by 
ten points. In Table 2 we record this as "WTPd ≥ 0.5", since this choice pattern reveals that in 
the domain of disadvantageous inequality the decision maker is willing to give up at least half 
a point in order to increase the other’s material payoff by one point. Here, WTP stands for 
"willingness to pay" (for an income increase of the passive agent), and the superscript 
indicates the domain (d stands for disadvantageous and a for advantageous inequality). By 
contrast, a rational decision maker who decides for the asymmetric allocation for the first time 
in the fourth choice or later (or chooses the egalitarian allocation throughout the block) 
reveals malevolence in the domain of disadvantageous inequality. Malevolence means that the 
decision maker is willing to give up own income to decrease the material payoff of the 
passive agent – in Table 2 malevolence manifests itself in a negative WTP. Similarly, when 
faced with the binary decisions in the advantageous inequality block, a rational subject who is 
(at least weakly) benevolent in the domain of advantageous inequality decides for the 
asymmetric allocation for the first time in the fourth choice or later, while switching earlier 
(or favoring the asymmetric allocation all the time) is inconsistent with weak benevolence 
(and therefore counted as malevolence) in this domain. Again, benevolence is associated with 
a positive WTP and malevolence is associated with a negative WTP. 
Below we will sometimes work with the proxies of the WTP measure of distributional 
preferences shown in the last column of Table 2. Using the information about the WTP of a 
decision maker in the two domains allows classifying subjects into archetypes of 
distributional preferences. Specifically, we define the following types: 
• EFF: a decision maker who is benevolent in both domains is efficiency loving; 
• IAV: a decision maker who is benevolent when ahead, but malevolent when 
behind, is inequality averse; 
• SPI: a decision maker who is malevolent in both domains is spiteful; 
                                                 
2 The procedure relies only on minimal assumptions regarding the rationality of agents. In terms of axioms on 
preferences the assumptions are ordering (completeness and transitivity) and strict (own-money) monotonicity – 
see Kerschbamer (2010) for details. In the main text, agents whose preferences satisfy those two basic axioms 
are referred to as “rational”. 
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• ILO: a decision maker who is benevolent in the domain of disadvantageous, but 
malevolent in the domain of advantageous inequality, is inequality loving.3 
Note that according to this classification selfish subjects are assigned to one of the four 
distributional preference types according to their ‘impartial view’ expressed in their choice 
behaviour in the third row of the two decision blocks in Table 1 (where a subject decides 
between two allocations that differ only in the payoff of the passive agent). We also tried an 
alternative classification distinguishing between the five types ‘strongly efficiency loving’, 
‘strongly inequality averse’, ‘strongly spiteful’, ‘strongly inequality loving’, and ‘selfish’. 
Qualitatively, the results reported in sections 3 and 4 are very similar with this alternative 
classification. 
 
2.2. Sessions and Treatments 
The experiment was run over two weeks in December 2010 at the University of Innsbruck. 
All sessions were computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). With ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004), we recruited 198 students from various academic backgrounds. We ran twelve sessions 
with 12 to 18 subjects in each session, depending on subject turnout. 
 In week 1 we elicited the distributional preferences of all subjects using the 
incentivized procedure outlined in Subsection 2.1, so that we were able to characterize each 
subject by a two-dimensional preference index (WTPd and WTPa), or alternatively by a 
distributional preference type (EFF, IAV, SPI or ILO). When making their choices, subjects 
knew that they would receive two cash payments for this task, one as an active person and one 
as a passive person.4 After having made their choices in the distributional preference tasks, 
subjects took the Machiavelli personality test (Christie and Geis, 1970), which consists of 20 
questions aimed at measuring a person’s assertiveness and ability to impose his or her opinion 
on others, on a scale between 20 and 100. Subjects also took a ten-question version of the 
Big-5 personality questionnaire (Gosling et al., 2003), which analyses personality along five 
fundamental traits termed extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and 
openness. No payment was made in week 1 – subjects were rather informed already in the 
                                                 
3 The category ILO is introduced for completeness only; we do not expect to find many of them (although there 
is some evidence in Fershtman et al., 2012, for this type). Note that in the literature spiteful subjects are 
sometimes called “competitive” or “status seeking”, while inequality averse subjects are sometimes called 
“egalitarian”. Also note that subjects who reveal benevolence in both domains could be labeled “altruistic” 
instead of “efficiency loving”. See Kerschbamer (2010) for a discussion and for references. 
4 We employed the double role assignment protocol as used by Andreoni and Miller (2002), for instance, in their 
dictator games. This means that in our protocol each decision making entity (individual or team) makes 
distributional choices, and each entity receives two payoffs, one as an active decision maker and one as a passive 
agent. 
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recruiting mail that the experiment would consist of two parts distributed over two 
consecutive weeks and that they would receive their total payment at the end of the second 
week, provided they attended both parts. 
In week 2 we implemented two decision-making regimes. In the individual regime 
subjects simply repeated the procedure of week 1 for the elicitation of distributional 
preferences. In the team regime subjects were randomly assigned to groups of three and we 
elicited distributional preferences at the team level. Specifically, teams were asked to make 
the ten binary choices of the elicitation task, deciding on payoff allocations each implying a 
payoff for each team member (the same for each member) and a payoff for each member of a 
so-called “passive team” (again, the same for each member). Team members knew that they 
would receive two payments from this task, a payoff as a member of the active team as well 
as a payoff as a member of the passive team, similar to the individual regime of week 1 as 
described above. In both regimes at the end of the week 2 session each subject received two 
cash payments per week, one as an active person and one as a passive person. For each of 
these cash payments, one of the ten binary choices was randomly selected by the computer 
and implemented. 
The rule for decision making within teams was that all ten choices had to be 
unanimous. Specifically, each team member was initially exposed to the ten binary choices 
and was asked to submit his or her proposals for the ten team decisions. Once each of the 
three team members had done so for each of the decision tasks, the proposal of each member 
was shown on a new screen, so that everyone could identify the cases of disagreement. After 
that, a chat room was opened for five minutes, in which the team members could 
communicate in order to achieve a unanimous decision. The chat content was unrestricted, 
except that subjects were explicitly told not to identify themselves in any way and neither to 
use offensive language nor to threaten others. At the end of the first chat round, each member 
was again asked to submit a proposal for the team decisions. If unanimity was reached at this 
stage, the ten choices were implemented and the team waited for the rest of the session. If 
unanimity was not reached, the updated decisions submitted by each member were shown 
again, and at the same time the team was given a second opportunity to chat, this time for 
three minutes. Exactly the same procedure was repeated for a maximum of five chat rounds. 
Subjects were informed at the beginning that in case that unanimity within a team was not 
reached before the end of the fifth chat round, all members of that team would receive a 
payment of zero, while the payment for the corresponding passive team would be randomly 
determined by the computer.  
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Our design allows us to make the following comparisons, which will form the core of 
our analysis: 
 
(i) At a first stage, in order to test for successful randomization, we will compare 
the week 1 choices of subjects who were assigned (in week 2) to the individual 
regime to those of subjects assigned (in week 2) to the team regime. We call 
those two sets of observations IND1 and TEAM1, respectively. 
(ii) To determine whether choices remain stable over time, we will compare the 
choices in week 1 and in week 2 of those subjects who were assigned to the 
individual regime in week 2. We call those two sets of observations IND1 (as 
above) and IND2, respectively. 
(iii) To test for the presence of a treatment effect (individual regime versus team 
regime) we will rely on two different sources of information. First, we will 
compare the week 2 choices in the individual regime to those in the team regime. 
These two sets of observations are called IND2 (as above) and TEAM2, 
respectively. Second, we will compare the choices in TEAM1 to those in 
TEAM2. Differences in this latter comparison potentially also reveal that team 
decision making changes revealed distributional preferences, in the sense that 
the same subjects reach different choices when they act individually and when 
they act as part of a team. However, while the comparison IND2 vs. TEAM2 
compares individual and team decisions between subjects, the comparison 
TEAM1 vs. TEAM2 compares choices within subjects – once taken 
individually, once taken within a team. For this latter comparison, it is important 
to control for the effect of exposing the same subjects to the same task twice, as 
we do in comparison (ii) above.  
We ran nine sessions for TEAM1 and TEAM2, and three sessions for IND1 and IND2, with 
the purpose of (roughly) equalizing the number of independent observations between the two 
decision-making regimes in week 2. In the end, we were able to collect 54 observations for 
the individual regime and 47 observations for the team regime (i.e., observations from 47 
teams, or 141 subjects). These numbers exclude three subjects who made inconsistent choices, 
hence bringing the total number of subjects used in our analysis to 195. Sessions lasted for 
approximately 45 minutes in week 1 and in TEAM2 in week 2, and approximately 30 
minutes in IND2 in week 2. The average total earning per subject was €9.40. 
 10 
 
 
3. Revealed Distributional Preferences of Individuals and Teams 
We begin by analyzing the differences between individual and team choices along the 
comparisons described in Subsection 2.2 (i.e., among IND1, IND2, TEAM1 and TEAM2). 
Later, in Section 4, we will delve into the specifics of the decision-making process within 
teams and the way that this translates individual preferences into team choices. 
 
3.1. Revealed Willingness to Pay 
Our first main finding is that willingness to pay in the domain of disadvantageous inequality 
depends strongly on the decision-making regime (individual regime versus team regime), 
while willingness to pay in the domain of advantageous inequality does not. This is shown in 
the two regressions of Table 3. The dependent variables, WTPd and WTPa, are the proxies for 
willingness to pay as defined in the last column of Table 2 – each of them can take on six 
possible discrete values in the interval [-0.5, 0.5], where a higher value indicates higher 
willingness to pay for an increase in the income of the passive agent. Thus, a higher value of 
WTPd (WTPa, respectively) corresponds to more benevolence in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality (advantageous inequality, respectively). Both regressions are 
ordered probits and comparisons are made among IND1, IND2, TEAM1 and TEAM2, with 
IND1 left out as the reference group.  
 
<insert Table 3 about here> 
 
The insignificant coefficients on Team1 reveal that randomization into treatments has 
been successful. Moreover, choices remain constant over time since the coefficient on Ind2 is 
also insignificant and very close to zero. In column (1), we further see that team decisions 
significantly increase WTPd: the within-subjects comparison TEAM1 vs. TEAM2 is captured 
by the significantly positive difference Team2 - Team1 (p = 0.02, F test), and the between-
subjects comparison of the choices of teams and individuals in week 2 in the significantly 
positive difference Team2 - Ind2 (p = 0.03, F test). 
By contrast, there are no significant differences in WTPa between individual and team 
decisions. The joint coefficients Team2 - Team1 as well as Team2 - Ind2 are insignificant. 
Hence, we conclude that the willingness to pay in the domain of advantageous inequality is 
not affected by whether distributional choices are made by teams or individuals, while in the 
domain of disadvantageous inequality teams make more benevolent choices than individuals, 
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leading to higher efficiency. This latter interpretation will be taken up in the following 
section, which discusses the distributional preference types that emerge in each treatment.  
All of the above results remain qualitatively the same if, instead of ordered probit 
regressions, we employ non-parametric tests to compare the four sets of observations. In 
particular, willingness to pay in the domain of disadvantageous inequality (WTPd) is 
significantly higher when decisions are taken by teams compared to individuals (p < 0.01, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test of TEAM1 vs. TEAM2; p = 0.06, Mann-Whitney U-test of IND2 
vs. TEAM2). At the same time, the above tests applied to WTPa reveal that the decision-
making regime does not affect benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality (p > 
0.4, TEAM1 vs. TEAM2; p > 0.5, IND2 vs. TEAM2). 
 
<insert Table 4 about here> 
 
 
3.2. Revealed Distributional Preference Types 
Table 4 classifies the decision makers in each of the four sets of observations in distributional 
preference types. All of our findings are in line with the treatment differences documented in 
the previous section in the analysis of willingness to pay. The first thing to notice, by 
comparing the first two columns in Table 4, is that our randomization was successful, as 
documented by the insignificant differences in proportions between IND1 and TEAM1 (p > 
0.1, χ²-tests for all four types of distributional preferences). Moreover, individual behavior 
remains constant over time, in the sense that the fact that subjects are exposed to the same set 
of decisions in two consecutive weeks does not have a significant impact on the distribution 
of revealed preference types (comparison between IND1 and IND2; p > 0.3, McNemar’s tests 
for all four types). 
On the contrary, the significant differences between TEAM1 and TEAM2 reveal that 
it matters a lot whether choices are made by individuals or by teams. In particular, 
McNemar’s test results for within-subjects comparisons reveal that the same individuals are 
significantly more likely to make choices consistent with efficiency maximization in week 2 – 
when they decide as members of a team – than in week 1 when they decide as individuals (p < 
0.01); and also that their choices in week 2 are significantly less often classified as inequality 
averse (p < 0.01) or as spiteful (p = 0.05) than in week 1. 
Given the previous comparisons, it is hardly surprising that we document strong and 
significant differences between the choices of individuals and teams in week 2 (see the last 
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two columns of Table 4). These differences allow for a nice overview of our main findings 
regarding how decision making by individuals and by teams results in different distributions 
of types. In particular, the vast majority of teams (44 of 47, or 94%) are classified as 
efficiency loving. This percentage is (with 70%) markedly lower among individuals, and the 
difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01, chi squared test). This result echoes the finding 
that teams display higher willingness to pay (benevolence) than individuals in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality. A second striking finding is that there is not a single team that is 
classified as inequality averse! Although not higher than 15%, the share of inequality averse 
choices is significantly higher in treatment IND2 (p < 0.01, chi squared test). Spiteful types 
are also more common among individuals than among teams, although this time the 
difference is not quite significant (13% vs. 4%, p = 0.13), probably due to the low number of 
observations. 
 
<insert Table 5 about here> 
 
 
4. Decision-Making Process within Teams 
Having documented substantial differences in the final choices of individuals and teams, we 
now turn to the specifics of the process of team decision making which can give us insights 
into the sources of these differences. All 47 teams managed to reach a unanimous decision, so 
the default payment was never implemented. Two teams did not need to chat at all, because 
their initial choices happened to coincide. About half of the teams (21 of 47, or 45%) reached 
unanimity after the first chat opportunity (i.e., at the end of Stage 1). Fourteen teams reached 
unanimity after Stage 2, five teams needed a third chat round, three teams needed a fourth 
chat round, and two teams had to use all five chat rounds – but also managed to agree in the 
end. 
 
4.1. Aggregation of Distributional Preferences 
We begin this part of the analysis by giving an overview of the relation between the 
distributional preferences of team members (as elicited in TEAM1 in week 1) and the 
resulting team type (as elicited in TEAM2 in week 2). 
As can be seen in Table 5, whenever at least two efficiency lovers are in the team, the 
team is always also of type EFF – with just one exception of a team that has an inequality 
lover and becomes SPI. This table is in more general terms indicative of the fact that will be 
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discussed in detail in the analysis that follows: efficiency lovers appear to be in a better 
position to assert themselves within the team and convince their teammates to adopt their 
preferred distributional choices. 
 
4.2. Assertiveness in the Decision-Making Process 
We measure a team member’s assertiveness by means of his or her ability to influence the 
team’s decision-making process so that the team’s final choices differ as little as possible 
from the individual’s initial proposals. For this purpose we create the variable assert, which is 
defined for each team member as the number of final team choices (out of 10) that are the 
same as the proposals submitted by that team member at the initial stage of the experiment in 
week 2 (i.e., before the start of the team interaction via the chat process). The idea is then to 
relate assertiveness to individual willingness to pay as well as to distributional types – as they 
have been elicited in week 1. 
 Beginning with types, a simple look at the mean number of own choices coinciding 
with those of the team reveals that efficiency lovers are, on average, much more successful 
than the rest in getting their proposals through within the team. Their average success rate is 
nine choices out of ten, in contrast to 7.58 choices for inequality averse individuals and 6.4 
choices for spiteful types. Pairwise comparisons reveal that the difference between EFF and 
these two other types is statistically significant (p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney tests). Inequality 
lovers are actually almost as successful as EFF in getting their proposed choices to be adopted 
by the team (mean assert equals 8.75), but the fact that there are only four individuals 
classified as inequality lovers limits the power of statistical inference for this type. 
 
<insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Naturally, a team member’s ability to impose his or her proposals is expected to 
depend on the distribution of types within teams. Since a team is made up of three members, 
having at least one more person of the same type is expected to substantially increase one’s 
assertiveness within the team. In Table 6 we report results from two Tobit regressions that 
aim to explain assertiveness based on distributional preferences and some further controls. 
The dependent variable is assert. On the right hand side we place, in (1), the various 
distributional types – with EFF left out as the reference group. To control for the composition 
of teams in terms of preference types, we include an explanatory variable called at least one 
same: this variable is 1 for a subject if at least one other member of the team is of the same 
 14 
type. In (2), the explanatory variables are the two indices of willingness to pay, WTPd and 
WTPa. To account for interdependence between the three members within a given team, the 
regressions report standard errors clustered at the team level. 
The results in column (1) of Table 6 confirm that the success rates of efficiency lovers 
are generally higher, but the difference is significant only in comparison to spiteful types. In 
particular, the coefficient on SPI in column (1) is negative and highly significant, revealing 
that spiteful types are able to get through two choices less compared to efficiency minded 
individuals. Inequality averse types are also less successful at asserting their proposals than 
EFF, but more so than SPI. However, the difference to EFF is not significant, and neither is 
the difference to SPI (F test, p = 0.32). As expected, having at least one other person of the 
same type within the team substantially increases one’s assertiveness: the coefficient of at 
least one same is larger than one, and it is significant. 5 
In column (2), we see that willingness to pay in the domain of disadvantageous 
inequality is a strong predictor of assertiveness, with more benevolent subjects (higher WTPd) 
asserting, on average, a significantly higher number of proposals – the difference is more than 
four proposals. This result is not unexpected, in the sense that subjects with a high willingness 
to pay are more efficiency-minded, and we know that efficiency lovers are the most assertive 
ones within a team. On the contrary, the coefficient of WTPa is practically zero, and once 
again this dimension does not appear to matter in team decision making. The regressions 
control for gender, age, as well as for individual scores in the Machiavelli personality test. 
None of these variables has a significant impact on assertiveness. 
We tried alternative specifications, for instance replacing at least one same in (1) with 
the number of same-type members in the team (i.e., 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether none, 
one or two other members revealed the same type). All the results remain qualitatively the 
same. We also tried regressions including the Big-5 traits elicited in week 1. The additional 
variables are all insignificant and do not change any of our results; therefore they are not 
reported here. Finally, we note that both specifications in Table 6 are robust to group fixed 
effects. 
 
4.3. Content Analysis  
Having identified differences in assertiveness between types, we next ask the question of how 
these differences emerge through the process of intra-team communication. Hence, the final 
                                                 
5 We have also estimated a specification in which we interact the variable at least one same with the various 
types. Our results (not reported in Table 6 for the sake of parsimony) indicate that having another team member 
of the same type is more important for spiteful types than for efficiency lovers: the effect is highly significant for 
both types, but the coefficient for SPI is much higher than for EFF (3.70 vs. 1.14). 
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step in our analysis of preference aggregation within a team is the study of the chat content. 
For this purpose, we employed two research assistants who had to read the entire chat 
independently and to identify all arguments that belonged to a number of relevant categories. 
These categories, outlined in Table 7, had been previously determined by two members of the 
research team who independently read parts of the chat logs and identified relevant arguments 
and statements. This procedure for content analysis is standard practice in experimental work 
in economics (see, for example, Cooper and Kagel, 2005). A subject was classified by the two 
coders as having used the argument of a certain category if that argument was found in any 
round of his or her chat history. In that case, a value of one was assigned to that particular 
category for the subject in question; otherwise the assigned value was zero. The cross-coder 
correlation over all categories was 0.61. Finally, to create a single variable for each category 
and subject, we averaged the entries of the two coders so that the final value of the variable 
could be zero, one half (if only one of the coders classified that entry as an argument), or one 
(if both coders did so).6  
 
<insert Table 7 about here> 
 
 Table 7 also shows the frequency with which the various types of arguments were 
used in the chats. The most commonly used argument is the maximization of own material 
payoffs (selfish argument), and it is employed by roughly one in six individuals regardless of 
type – with the exception of the four individuals classified as ILO, who never used this 
argument. The majority argument A1 is also used relatively often by individuals of all types. 
The positive arguments A3i and A3ii, on the other hand, are used almost exclusively by 
efficiency lovers, and so is the conditional cooperation argument. Also, as one might expect, 
efficiency lovers are the only ones who use arguments in favor of cake size maximization and 
Pareto efficiency. There are only five cases of weak negative and only one case of strong 
negative arguments, therefore for the remainder of the analysis we pool these two categories 
under a single “negative” category, called A4. 
Table 8 replicates the two regressions of Table 6, adding the ten types of arguments as 
explanatory variables. The first thing to note is that all the findings presented in section 4.2 
are robust to this change in specification. With respect to the success of the various types of 
arguments, one observes the following. First, somewhat counter-intuitively, selfish arguments 
                                                 
6 An alternative procedure would have been to assign a value of one to a particular argument if at least one of the 
two coders classified it as such. To check robustness, we repeated the analysis in this section using this 
alternative method. This led to only a few minor changes in the results; details are available upon request. 
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(category A2) are detrimental to assertiveness. It appears to be the case that openly advocating 
a purely selfish choice criterion limits one’s success in convincing the rest of the team. An 
interesting pattern emerges for positive arguments (categories A3i and A3ii). Statements in 
favor of altruistic behavior towards the passive team are counterproductive if they suggest the 
sacrifice of own payoffs (strong positive attitude), but they have an impact if they involve a 
costless improvement (weak positive attitude) – although the latter effect is only weakly 
significant in the second specification. The other categories of “distributional” arguments (i.e., 
statements referring explicitly to choice criteria for the payoff allocation, such as negative 
attitude, welfare maximization, Pareto efficiency, and fairness) all have insignificant 
coefficients, but we do find that certain “non-distributional” arguments matter: subjects who 
play the “majority card” (A1) are, on average, more successful at convincing their team to 
adopt their initial proposals, and so are those who urge for unanimity (A9) in order to avoid 
implementation of the default allocation (which yields zero income for the team members). 
 
<insert Table 8 about here> 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has compared revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams, 
focusing in particular on the question how the revealed distributional preferences of team 
members shape a team’s allocation decisions. We have found strong differences between 
individuals and teams in revealed distributional preferences. Specifically, teams are 
significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality, 
while benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across decision-
making regimes. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that teams never 
make choices that are consistent with any form of inequality aversion, while a substantial 
fraction (15%) of individuals are classified as inequality averse. Spiteful types are also 
markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the other hand, teams are 
far more often classified as efficiency lovers. The fact that team decision making results in a 
very high proportion (over 90%) of choices consistent with a taste for efficiency and at the 
same time eliminates choices consistent with inequality aversion, is in our view the single 
most interesting result of this study. Our analysis of the communication within teams (via 
chat) has shown that efficiency lovers are more assertive, meaning that they are better in 
implementing their preferences even when other team members have divergent individual 
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preferences. Moreover, our chat analysis has revealed that some arguments are more 
persuasive than others. In particular, an interesting finding has been that appeals to own-
money maximization make it less likely to get one’s way, indicating that convincing others to 
follow a particular suggestion needs more socially acceptable arguments. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Choices in the Distributional-Preferences Elicitation Task  
 
Disadvantageous Inequality Block 
 
LEFT Your Choice 
(please mark) 
RIGHT 
you 
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 you  
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 
15 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                  RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
19 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
21 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
25 Points 
 
30 Points 
 
 
LEFT                      RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
Advantageous Inequality Block 
 
LEFT Your Choice 
(please mark) 
RIGHT 
you 
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 you 
get 
passive agent 
gets 
 
15 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                  RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
19 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
21 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
25 Points 
 
10 Points 
 
 
LEFT                     RIGHT 
 
20 Points 
 
20 Points 
 
 21 
Table 2: Choices in the Elicitation Task and Revealed WTP  
 
Disadvantageous Inequality Block (DIB) 
 
 
in the DIB subject 
chooses LEFT for the 
first time in row 
WTPd   proxy for WTP
d  
used 
1 +0.5 ≤   WPTd  +0.5 
2 +0.1  ≤   WPTd  < +0.5 +0.3 
3 +0.0  ≤   WPTd  < +0.1 +0.05 
4 -0.1 ≤   WPTd  < -0.0 -0.05 
5 -0.5 ≤   WPTd  < -0.1 -0.3 
never       WPTd  < -0.5 -0.5 
 
 
 
Advantageous Inequality Block (AIB) 
 
 
in the AIB subject 
chooses LEFT for the 
first time in row 
WTPa   proxy for WTP
a  
used 
1       WPTa  ≤ -0.5 -0.5 
2 -0.5  <  WPTa  ≤ -0.1 -0.3 
3 -0.1  <  WPTa  ≤ -0.0 -0.05 
4 +0.0 <  WPTa  ≤ +0.1 +0.05 
5 +0.1 <  WPTa  ≤ 0.5 +0.3 
never +0.5 <  WPTa       +0.5 
 
 
 
WTPd for WPTd > 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is 
willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order to 
increase the other's material payoff by one unit 
 
for WPTd< 0: |WTPd| = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is 
willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order to 
decrease the other's material payoff by one unit (in this interpretation 
inequalities need to be reversed; for instance, subjects who never switch on the 
X-list reveal that they are willing to give up at least 50 Cents of their own 
income to decrease the income of the other player by 1 Euro) 
 
WTPa defined analogously for the domain of advantageous inequality 
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Regressions on the Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
Dependent Variable: WTPd WTPa 
Ind2 
-0.028 
(0.210) 
0.082 
(0.210) 
Team1 
0.009 
(0.184) 
0.167 
(0.187) 
Team2 
0.372 * 
(0.200) 
0.223 
(0.205) 
Team 2 - Team1 0.363 ** 0.056 
Team2 - Ind2 0.400 ** 0.141 
N = 296; standard errors in brackets; 
 *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Distributional Preference Types 
 IND1 TEAM1 IND2 TEAM2 
EFF 66.7% 78.0% 70.4% 93.6% 
IAV 13.0% 8.5% 14.8% 0.0% 
SPI 13.0% 10.6% 13.0% 4.3% 
ILO 7.4% 2.8% 1.9% 2.1% 
N 54 141 54 141 (47 Teams) 
In the within-subjects comparison TEAM1 vs. TEAM2, we are using the team’s 
decision as the decision of each individual subject (so that N=141 for those tests). 
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Table 5: Correspondence between Types of Team Members and Team Types 
Types of Team Members: Team Type: 
Mean # of Stages 
to Unanimity 
N 
3 x EFF EFF (22) 1.41 22 
2 x EFF, 1 x SPI EFF (10) 2.30 10 
2 x EFF, 1 x IAV EFF (6) 2.17 6 
2 x EFF, 1 x ILO EFF (2), SPI (1) 1.33 3 
1 x EFF, 1 x IAV, 1 x SPI EFF (2), ILO (1) 3.0 3 
1 x EFF, 1 x IAV, 1 x ILO EFF (1) 2.0 1 
1 x EFF, 2 x SPI SPI (1) 2.0 1 
1 x EFF, 2 x IAV EFF (1) 2.0 1 
Total EFF (44), SPI (2), IL (1) 1.83 47 
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Table 6: Assertiveness in the Decision-Making Process 
Tobit regressions, marginal effects.  
Dependent variable: assert (right-censored at 10, left-censored at 0) 
 (1) (2) 
SPI -2.065 ** (0.856)  
IAV -0.820 (0.903)  
ILO 1.108 (1.351)  
at least one same 1.339 ** (0.551)  
WTPd  4.225 *** (1.094) 
WTPa  0.005 (1.138) 
female 0.039 (0.410) 
0.269 
(0.459) 
age 0.019 (0.051) 
0.053 
(0.044) 
Machiavelli 0.007 (0.013) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
Prob > F 0.000 0.001 
N = 141; standard errors in brackets, clustered by team; 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% level respectively. 
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Table 7: Chat Content, Categories of Arguments 
Category                       Description Relative Frequency 
A1 majority: when two members have the same 
preference, the third member should follow 
0.131 
A2 selfish: simply maximize own material payoff 0.160 
A3i weak positive: willingness to give more to the passive 
team, provided this comes at no own cost 
0.074 
A3ii strong positive: willingness to give something up in 
order to increase the passive team’s payoff 
0.092 
A4i weak negative: tendency to give less to the passive 
team, provided this comes at no own cost 
0.025 
A4ii strong negative: willingness to give something up in 
order to reduce the passive team’s payoff 
0.004 
A5 cake size maximization: maximize total payoff 0.074 
A6 Pareto: increase payoff of both teams 0.025 
A7 fairness/egalitarianism: fairness-related arguments 0.050 
A8 conditional cooperation: place themselves in the 
position of the passive team, recognizing that 
cooperation among teams could maximize total 
earnings 
0.064 
A9 unanimity at any cost: want to reach a unanimous 
decision quickly, exact choices are less important 
0.064 
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Table 8: Content Analysis 
Tobit regressions, marginal effects.  
Dependent variable: assert (right-censored at 10, left-censored at 0) 
 (1) (2) 
SPI -1.774 ** 
(0.717) 
 
IAV -0.744 
(0.846) 
 
ILO 1.002 
(1.235) 
 
at least one same 1.374 *** 
(0.480) 
 
WTPd  3.992 *** 
(1.056) 
WTPa  -0.210 
(1.138) 
female 0.085 
(0.041) 
0.155 
(0.458) 
age 0.035 
(0.054) 
0.053 
(0.040) 
Machiavelli 0.002 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
A1 1.760 ** 
(0.802) 
1.260 * 
(0.671) 
A2 -1.060 * 
(0.560) 
-1.305 ** 
(0.526) 
A3i 1.915 
(1.215) 
1.073 * 
(0.564) 
A3ii -1.949 ** 
(0.835) 
-1.414 ** 
(0.569) 
A4 -0.587 
(2.071) 
-0.392 
(1.727) 
A5 0.663 
(0.964) 
0.708 
(0.822) 
A6 0.407 
(1.246) 
-0.267 
(1.037) 
A7 -1.157 
(0.792) 
-0.583 
(0.752) 
A8 0.039 
(0.927) 
-0.546 
(0.685) 
A9 1.365 * 
(0.808) 
0.871 
(0.557) 
Prob > F 0.001 0.001 
N = 141; standard errors in brackets, clustered by team;  
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix: Experimental instructions (translated from German) – not 
intended for publication 
 
General instructions, handed out at the beginning of the session 
 
 
Welcome to a decision making experiment. Thanks a lot for your participation. 
 
 
Please do not talk to any other participant for the rest of the experiment. The following 
instructions use masculine expressions for a better comprehension. Please note that these expressions 
should be understood as gender neutral.  
 
During the experiment you and the other participants have to make decisions. You have to 
enter the decisions on the computer. During the experiment you will interact with other 
participants, but you won’t know who your “teammates” are. Your payment will be affected 
by your own decisions and the decisions of your “teammates”. The rules regarding the 
calculation of your payment follow below. You will only be informed of your own payment, 
and not of the payment of other participants. 
 
The experiment has two parts. The first part will start immediately and last for about 30 
minutes. The second part will take place next Wednesday (15.12, same time, same place). 
This part will last for about 35 minutes. The decisions made during the first part have no 
effect on the second part. 
 
You will receive further information at the beginning of each part. We will read aloud the 
information at the beginning of each part, and then you will have the chance to ask questions. 
 
During the experiment you will see a clock at the top of some screens (input screens). This 
clock shows you the remaining time until you have to make a decision. It is strictly forbidden 
to exceed this time (further details follow). 
 
Your payment is counted in points. Points will be converted into EUROS at the end of the 
entire experiment. We will pay the converted amount in cash to all participants. Please note 
that you will receive the whole payment at the end of the second part. You will only 
receive the payment if you participate in both parts of the experiment. If you are unable to 
come next week, you will not receive the payment of the first session. 
 
 
If you have any questions – also during the experiments – please raise your hand or draw the 
attention of one of the experimenters. We will come to your place. Please do not ask your 
question aloud in class.  
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Instructions: First part of the experiment 
 
Today’s session includes 10 decision situations. The computer connects you with a partner 
for each decision situation. You will get a new partner for every decision situation. We call 
this person your passive person (later you will understand why we call this person your 
passive person). You will never get to know the identity of you partners.  
 
 
Your payment will be counted in points. 
The rate of exchange is: 
5 points = 1 EURO 
 
You will have to make 10 decisions. The decision situations are quite similar. You can choose 
between two alternatives: LEFT or RIGHT. Every decision affects your payment and the 
payment of your passive person. 
 
Example: 
You will be asked to choose LEFT or RIGHT. If you choose LEFT you get 19 points and your 
passive person 30 points. Alternative RIGHT brings you and your passive person 20 points. 
You have to choose one alternative. Below you see a picture (of the screen) for this situation: 
 
 
 
 
 
You have to make 10 decisions of this type. Your payment will be calculated as follows: 
 
Payment as an active person: The computer makes a random selection, choosing one out of 
the 10 situations (separately for each person). The decision made in this situation is relevant 
for your payment. If for instance you would choose RIGHT in the above situation, each of 
you (active and passive person) would receive 20 points. 
 
Payment as a passive person: The passive person does nothing for his payment. In the same 
way that you are matched with a passive person, you are the passive person of another 
participant in the experiment. It is ruled out that you have the same partner as your active and 
as your passive person. This means that when person X is you passive person you cannot be 
the passive person of X.  
 
 
You will see your decision situations on the screen. You can change your choices as long as 
you do not click on the “OK”-button. When you click on the “OK”-button your decisions are 
irrevocable. You have 15 minutes to click on the “OK”-button at your screen. If you do not do 
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so within the 15 minutes your payment for the first part will be zero. The payment for your 
passive person in this case is not zero: the computer randomly chooses one out of the ten 
decision situations and also randomly chooses LEFT or RIGHT. This amount is relevant for 
the passive person’s payment. 
 
This part of the experiment ends after the ten decisions have been made. You won’t find out 
the selected decision at the end of part one, but only at the end of the second part of the 
experiment next week. 
 
 
 
Instructions: Second part of the experiment, Individual Regime 
 
 
[This set of instructions was practically identical to the instructions for the first 
part of the experiment] 
 
 
 
Instructions: Second part of the experiment, Team Regime 
 
 
At the beginning of the sessions participants are randomly assigned to groups. Every 
participant is member of one group. Every group has three group members. You will never 
find out something about the identity of the other group members. 
 
In the second part of the experiment you have to make 10 group decisions. Later we will 
describe the mechanism regarding group decisions. The computer will randomly match your 
group with another group for each decision situation. We call this group the passive group 
(later you will understand why we call this group your passive group). You will never find out 
something about the identity of the passive group members.  
 
 
Your payment will be counted in points. 
The rate of exchange is: 
5 points = 1 EURO 
 
 
Your group will have to make 10 decisions. In each situation you can choose between two 
alternatives: LEFT or RIGHT. Every decision affects your group payment and the payment of 
your passive group. Please note that the points represent the payment for each group 
member and not the payment for the whole group. The payment for your group is three times 
higher. 
 
Example: 
Your group will be asked to choose LEFT or RIGHT. If you choose LEFT you get 19 points 
(group gets 3*19 points) and your passive group gets 90 points (30 points per person). 
Alternative RIGHT brings you and each of your group members 20 points. The other group 
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also gets 60 points (20 per person). You have to choose one alternative. Below you see a 
picture (of the screen) for this situation: 
 
 
 
 
 
You have to make 10 decisions of this type. Your payment will be calculated as follows: 
 
Payment as an active group: The computer makes a random selection, choosing one out of 
the 10 situations (separately for each group). The decision made in this situation is relevant 
for your group payment. If for instance your group would choose RIGHT in the above 
situation, both groups would receive 60 points (20 points for all active group members as well 
as for all passive group members). 
 
Payment as a passive group: The passive group does nothing for the payment. In the same 
way that you are matched with a passive group, you are the passive group of another group in 
the experiment. It is ruled out that you have the same group as an active and as your passive 
group. This means that when group X is you passive group you cannot be the passive group of 
group X.  
 
 
How to make a group decision? 
You have at most 5 rounds to make your group decision. 
 
At the beginning of round 1, you and your group members will be asked to make an initial 
proposal for each of the ten decisions. You should make your proposals within 5 minutes. 
As soon as all group members confirm their proposals, you will see them on your screen (of 
course, the group members of the passive group cannot see your proposals). The group 
members are able to identify in which of the ten decisions they agree or disagree. 
 
Then, you and your group members will be able to chat for 5 minutes, via electronic chat on 
the computer. The chat is open only for the active group (you cannot chat with the passive 
group). The goal of the chat is to come to a unanimous choice for all 10 situations. You have 
to press the RETURN button to send your message. Every group member has a fixed identity 
during the chat period (M1, M2, M3; random selection by the computer). The content of the 
chat is free. You just have to pay attention that (1) you do not violate the anonymity rule (do 
not communicate you name, sex or major at university) and (2) do not offend your group 
members. If you do not respect the communication rules you will not receive your payment 
from the experiment.  
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You can send as many messages as you want within the 5 minutes. All three of your group 
members can see your message immediately: it is not possible to send a message to one group 
member only. 
 
You can change your proposals for each decision situation during the 5 minutes of the 
chat. To confirm your new choices you have to click on the “OK”-button. If you don’t want 
to change any of your initial proposals, you should still click on “OK” to confirm them. 
 
 
The first decision round ends if: 
 
• all group members confirm their decisions with “OK”, or 
 
• there is no time left (if you forget to click on “OK” the computer will use your initial 
decisions) 
 
 
If your group has reached a unanimous choice at the end of round 1, your group decision is 
valid and the decision process ends. Otherwise, round 2 starts. 
 
Round 2 and the other decision rounds have the same characteristics as the first round. There 
is one difference: you have 3 instead of 5 minutes in order to chat and to enter your decisions. 
 
There will be at most 5 decision rounds. The group decision process ends when: 
 
• your group has reached a unanimous choice for all decision situations, or 
 
• the 5 decision rounds are over 
 
 
ATTENTION: The group decision is not valid unless all group members have reached 
the same decisions. You will receive no payment as an active group member for this part 
when you do not have a valid group decision. The payment for your passive group in this case 
is not zero: the computer randomly chooses one out of the ten decision situations and also 
randomly chooses LEFT or RIGHT. This amount is relevant for the passive group’s payment. 
 
 
At the end of the session you will be informed of the selected decision and of your payment 
for this part of the experiment. You will also receive information on the choices and payments 
in the first part of the experiment, and finally you will receive your entire payment from the 
experiment anonymously and in cash. 
 
 
